Economic outlook for the Euro area in 2009 and 2010 by MARCELLINO, Massimiliano
 1 
 
 
 
EFN REPORT 
 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE 
EURO AREA IN 2009 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spring 2009 
 
 
 2 
About the European Forecasting Network 
The European Forecasting Network (EFN) is a research group of European institutions, 
founded in 2001 under the auspices of the European Commission, and currently partly 
financially supported by the Schuman Centre at the European University Institute. The 
objective of the EFN is to provide a critical analysis of the current economic situation in 
the euro area, short-term forecasts of the main macroeconomic and financial variables, 
policy advice, and in-depth study of topics of particular relevance for the working of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union. The EFN publishes four quarterly reports. 
Further information on the EFN can be obtained from our web site, http://efn.eui.eu . 
 
Participating Institutions: 
Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute (Coordinator) 
Team Leader: Massimiliano Marcellino (massimiliano.marcellino@eui.eu) 
Centre d´Etudes Prospectives et d´Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
Team Leader: Lionel Fontagné (fontagne@cepii.fr) 
The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) 
Team Leader: Axel Lindner (Axel.Lindner@iwh-halle.de) 
The Department of Economics, European University Institute (EUI) 
Team Leader: Giancarlo Corsetti (Giancarlo.corsetti@eui.eu) 
Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR-IREA), Universitat de Barcelona 
Team Leader: Jordi Suriñach (jsurinach@ub.edu) 
Instituto Flores de Lemus ( IFL ), Universidad Carlos III 
Team Leader: Antoni Espasa (espasa@est-econ.uc3m.es) 
Department of Applied Economics (DAE ), University of Cambridge 
Team Leader: Sean Holly (sean.holly@econ.cam.ac.uk) 
 
Coordinator of the Report: Massimiliano Marcellino 
 
 
 
 
Report closed on March 23rd, 2009 
 3 
EFN REPORT 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA IN 2009 and 2010 
Highlights 
 
• For much of 2009, falling external demand will be the main drag on production 
in the euro area, with exports expected to decrease by about 13% in 2009. At the 
same time, the structural problems of the financial sector, combined with the 
uncertainty on future economic perspectives, will continue to impede 
investment, which will be reduced by about 6% in 2009. 
• Consumers will benefit from the increase in real wages that started in the sum-
mer of 2008 and will – due to the slow reaction of wage setting to the business 
cycle in most European countries – continue for the year 2009. Thus, private 
consumption will, albeit shrinking modestly (-0.6%) because of rising unem-
ployment, be a stabilizing factor for the economy in the euro area.  A positive 
contribution will also come from public consumption, whose growth is fore-
casted at 1% for 2009 and 0.5% for 2010. 
• Overall, we expect GDP in the euro area to shrink by 2.8% in 2009, with a mod-
est increase of 0.4% in 2010. This forecast is subject to substantial uncertainty, 
the interval forecast for growth in 2009 ranges from -3.6% to -2.1%, and it is 
conditional on a tentative stabilization of financial markets and the real sector, 
since governments will continue supporting ailing institutions. One major risk 
factor is that some euro area countries might no longer be able to do so, due to 
budgetary and debt problems. 
• Industrial production in the euro area will fall sharply during both 2009 and 
2010. The average decline will be of 16.3% and 3.2% respectively. Investment, 
intermediate and durable consumer goods are mainly responsible for this slump. 
• Consumer prices in the Euro Area are showing somewhat more stability than in 
the US. HICP inflation is expected to fall to 0.5% during this year, but to in-
crease to around 1.9% in 2010. The risk of deflation for the Euro Area economy 
is negligible. The core inflation index, which does not include energy and un-
processed food, will be around 1.6% during both years.  
• The expected paths for growth and inflation leave room for the ECB to further 
cut interest rates. However, the inflationary consequences of more aggressive 
policies, such as quantitative easing, could be worrying. 
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Table 1. Economic outlook for the Euro area 
  2006 2007 2008 2009: 1st half 2009: annual 2010: annual 
      
Point 
Forecast 
Interval 
Forecast
Point 
Forecast
Interval 
Forecast
Point 
Forecast
Interval 
Forecast
-3.7 -3.6 -0.7 
GDP 2.9 2.6 0.8 -3.1 -2.6 -2.8 -2.1 0.4 1.5 
1.7 1.7 1.6 
Potential Output 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 
-1.3 -1.5 -1.4 
Private Consumption 2.0 1.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.1 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.9 
0.8 0.6 0.0 
Government Consumption 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.3 0.5 1.1 
-8.1 -7.9 -2.4 
Fixed Capital Formation 5.6 4.4 0.4 -6.8 -5.6 -6.2 -4.5 0.1 2.5 
-14.0 -14.0 -1.3 
Exports 8.3 5.9 1.5 -12.8 -11.5 -12.7 -11.4 0.7 2.6 
-12.0 -13.0 -2.2 
Imports 8.2 5.3 1.5 -10.8 -9.5 -11.5 -10.1 0.2 2.4 
8.4 8.7 9.4 
Unemployment Rate 8.3 7.4 7.5 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.1 10.0 10.7 
2.5 2.4 2.1 
Labour Cost Index 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.6 
-3.0 -2.7 0.0 
Labour Productivity 1.4 0.8 -0.2 -2.6 -2.2 -2.2 -1.7 0.7 1.4 
0.4 0.1 1.1 
HICP 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.9 1.9 2.7 
-15,8 -18.0 -5.3 
IPI 
4.0 3.4 -1.7 -17.0 -18.2 -16.3 -14.6 -3,2 -1.1 
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for the output gap that is 
the deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP as a per cent of potential GDP and except for the unemployment 
rate. Point forecasts and 80% confidence bounds are taken from EFN forecasting model and based on 2000 stochastic 
simulations.  
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Economic Outlook for 2009 and 2010  
 
The world economy: in recession  
In spring 2009 the world economy is in its deepest downturn since the Great Depres-
sion. World production (measured by weighting GDP at present exchange rates) fell at 
the end of last year, as the recessions in the US, in the EU and in Japan became deeper. 
Particularly severe is the slump in world trade since autumn 2008. Apparently, the in-
tensification of the financial crisis after the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in Septem-
ber has played a fatal role: investment projects around the world have been cancelled, 
and bank credits for financing international trade became much more difficult to attain. 
Consequently, in those countries where export sectors are the driving engine of the 
economy, as in Japan or in Germany, the fall in production was particularly deep. The 
financial crisis hits more directly those countries that run high current account deficits 
or that have to serve high liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. Here, in particu-
lar in some Central and Eastern European countries, capital inflows dry up and curren-
cies are under pressure. The large emerging market countries China and India are also in 
a downturn, but not, at least up to now, in a recession.  
Leading indicators such as confidence surveys or data for orders give no signs for stabi-
lization at present. Fiscal stimuli, in particular the substantial programs of the US and of 
China, will not take full effect before summer. Monetary policy is very expansive in 
most countries by now, with key interest rates close to zero and central banks applying 
“unconventional measures” like “quantitative easing” in the US and Britain. But the 
crisis of the financial sector prevents a full transmission of the stimulus to the real sec-
tor, at least in the US and in parts of Western Europe. Markets for risk capital seem to 
share this view: stock prices have plunged again in February. That said, risk premia on 
the wholesale money markets in the US and the EU have retreated somewhat from their 
peaks in autumn, as have risk premia for bonds of firms with good, but not excellent 
ratings. If the financial sector is spared from new shockwaves, financial conditions 
should improve somewhat over the year. However, as the worsening state of the real 
sector will put more strain on banks everywhere, a tentative stabilization is plausible 
since governments will continue supporting ailing institutions. One major risk factor is 
that some countries might not be able to do so, as the example of Iceland has shown last 
autumn.  
All in all, our forecasts are based on the cautiously optimistic scenario that production 
in the US and in Japan stops contracting at the end of 2009 and China continues grow-
ing, so that world trade will stabilize this year. An upswing of the world economy is not 
in sight, at least not for 2009 and most of 2010. For this to happen, two conditions will 
have to be fulfilled: first, the banking sector in the US and in Europe must credibly re-
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cover from their structural ills. Second, the global imbalances have to be dealt with: 
since the US will, in all probability, no longer be available as the destination of excess 
world supply of goods, demand has to come from different sources. The economies with 
high current account surpluses during the recent past come into mind: expanding private 
demand beyond temporary fiscal programs will be a major task for economic policy in 
China, Japan, and Germany in the coming years.  
  
The euro area: slump of industrial production 
In the last quarter of 2008, the decline of output accelerated in the Euro area. Private 
households, for the first time in this downturn, cut expenditure on consumption mark-
edly. Investment had been falling since summer, partly due to the housing crises in 
Spain and Ireland; at the end of the year the fall was, with 2.7% relative to the second 
quarter, by far the steepest in the history of the currency union. Even more spectacular 
is the drop in foreign trade: exports contracted by more than 7%, imports by 5 ½%. Ex-
ports of goods and services were, in real terms, lower than two years ago. As can be 
inferred from balance-of-payment figures, the trade in goods is more affected than that 
in services. This fits in with the fall in industrial production that had begun early in 
2008 and has accelerated to over 3% relative to the previous month in January. Assess-
ments of order books (according to the survey by the European Commission) point to 
declining demand during the next quarters. Confidence is falling precipitously – not 
only in industry, but also in the construction sector and in services, as well as among 
consumers.  
For much of 2009, falling external demand will be the main drag on production. At the 
same time, the structural problems of the financial sector will continue to impede in-
vestment, although data from the ECB do not show a marked change to the worse: ac-
cording to the bank lending survey of January, banks expect to further tighten their cre-
dit standards, but, for the first time since the crisis began, to a lesser extent. Real costs 
of financing calculated by the ECB are high, but have stopped rising recently – possibly 
owing to the rate cuts and other expansive measures taken by the central bank, but also 
due to weak demand for capital. In addition, the problems of the financial sector aggra-
vate the housing crises in Spain and Ireland and put stress on other housing markets. 
Finally, the steep increase in risk premia for sovereign bonds of those member states 
that are perceived as vulnerable (in particular Greece, Ireland, and, to a lesser extent, 
Italy) limits the scope these states have for fiscal action. Still, fiscal programs in many 
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member states will dampen the recession: public investment will grow and the dispos-
able income of private households will be supported. Consumers will also benefit from 
the increase in real wages that started in the summer of 2008 and will – due to the slow 
reaction of wage setting to the business cycle in most European countries – continue for 
the year 2009. Thus, private consumption will, although shrinking because of rising 
unemployment, keep up relatively well. 
 
Figure 1. Quarterly GDP growth rates and confidence bands 
Percentage change over previous quarter. 
 
We forecast that the recession in the euro area bottoms out at the end of 2009, and that 
output will start expanding faster than the potential for production at the end of 2010. 
Overall, we expect GDP in the euro area to shrink by 2.8% in 2009, with a modest in-
crease of 0.4% in 2010. As mentioned in the first section, this forecast depends on the 
crucial assumptions that world trade stabilizes during this year, and that major shocks 
from the financial markets will be absent or can quickly be contained.  
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Figure 2. Contributions of domestic components and net exports to GDP growth 
 
Domestic demand dark, net exports light area. Percentage points, figures above or below the columns indicate overall 
GDP growth. 
 
Figure 3. Economic Sentiment Indicator and confidence bands 
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In the next two years we expect industrial production to fall sharply in the euro area. 
The fall will comprise  all sectors, excluding energy, and will be extremely intense in 
capital and intermediate goods and in durable consumption goods. On one side, this 
decline is due to the contraction of investment and international trade flows, as it was 
suggested in the first section of the report. On the other side, the credit crunch that firms 
and consumers are facing as a consequence of the financial crisis is harming the 
capacity of economic agents to finance their purchase/investment, worsening the 
recession in the industrial sector. The deep crisis of the industrial sector is being 
particularly harmful to the German economy which, in spite of maintaining high 
productivity gains in the last years, a reasonable level of public and private debt and a 
stable housing market, is now facing maybe the worst economic crisis since World War 
II.  
 
Table 2. Annual average rates for industrial production in the euro area 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Capital 3,42 2,99 5,87 5,99 -0,21 -23,20 -8,94 
Durable 0.09 -0.73 4.39 1.10 -5.41 -20.9 -6.64 
Intermediate 2.31 0.88 4.94 3.87 -2.77 -24.11 -3.87 
Non Durable  0.64 0.73 2.21 2.47 -2.77 -3.61 -1.41 
Energy 2.24 1.43 0.70 -0.60 0.72 1.30 1.65 
Total EMU 2.12 1.39 4.00 3.41 -1.65 -16.31 -3.23 
 
Regarding inflation, although headline inflation jumped to an all times high during last 
summer, the sharp fall in oil prices is now driving inflation rates down with similar 
speed and magnitude. Also the economic crisis and the fall in aggregate demand are 
increasing the downward pressure on consumer prices, especially on industrial goods. 
We expect the average inflation rate to be as low as 0.5% in 2009 while year on year 
monthly rates will probably be slightly negative in July and August. In spite of these 
figures, the risk of deflation for the Euro Area economy is still negligible. Apart from 
energy related products, the evolution of prices of other goods and services is being 
extremely stable. Core inflation will be around 1.6% in both 2009 and 2010 and we do 
not expect this figure to drop below 1.0% during the forecast horizon.  
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Figure 4. Euro Area Inflation Rate and confidence bands 
INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA
(year-on-year rates)
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Considering the expectations on inflation and growth it is not a surprise that the ECB 
has decided to lower the official interest rate to its historical minimum, 1.5%. In recent 
declarations the ECB board has made clear that further cuts are possible but that a zero 
interest rate strategy is outside the policy options considered by the European Central 
Bank. The markets have interpreted these warnings as a signal that 1% is the lower 
bound for the official interest rate in the euro area, and that this bound will be reached  
before the summer, although the exact timing of the new cuts is still not clear. Together 
with the interest rate policy, the ECB has transmitted to the markets its intention to fur-
ther provide ample liquidity to banks and to continue its supplementary longer-term 
refinancing operations but, at the same time, to tighten the conditions on the collateral 
required to access that liquidity. Overall the monetary policy of the ECB remains more 
conservative and rigid than other central banks (FEB, BOJ and BOE). While it is now 
widely accepted that restoring the confidence in and within the financial system is a 
necessary condition for the real economy to recover, the actions that the ECB might 
take in this direction are constrained by the lack of effective surveillance and normative 
power.   
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Comparison with alternative forecasts 
The forecasts presented above were obtained from the EFN macroeconometric model, 
described in detail in the EFN Spring 2002 report. Table 3 shows a comparison of the 
EFN forecasts for the main macroeconomic aggregates with other forecasts, notably 
those of the European Commission, the IMF, the ECB, the OECD, and Consensus 
Economics Inc.  
The GDP forecast of the EFN is very close to the consensus forecast with a view on 
investment that is a bit less gloomy and with growth rates for government consumption 
that are weaker than in the consensus forecast. In this context, it should be recalled that 
the fiscal programs mainly boost public investment, but not government consumption.  
The inflation forecasts of the EFN are quite below the average figure for 2009, but only 
slightly lower that the consensus and ECB estimations. With respect to 2010, it seems 
that most institutions forecast a slower convergence of the average inflation rate toward 
its long term average, while our figures (1.9%) are closer to those published by the Eu-
ropean Commission. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of EFN forecasts with alternative forecasts 
  
EFN EU IMF* ECB OECD Consensus 
  
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2008 2009 
GDP -2.8 0.4 -1.9 0.4 0.2 na -2.7 0.0 -0.6 1.2 -2.6 0.5 
Priv. Consumption -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 na -0.7 0.2 0.2 1.2 -0.7 0.5 
Gov. Consumption 1.0 0.5 1.6 1.2 1.6 na 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.8 
Fixed Capital Form. -6.2 0.1 -5.5 -0.7 -0.6 na -7.2 -2.3 -4.4 1.0 -6.8 -0.3 
Unemployment rate 8.9 10.0 9.3 10.2 8.3 na Na na 8.6 9.0 9.0 9.9 
HICP 0.5 1.9 1.0 1.8 1.9 na 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.3 0.6 1.5 
IP -16.3 -3.2 na na na na na na na na -0.7 2.0 
EU: European Commission, Interim Forecast, January 2009; IMF: World Economic Outlook, September 2008; ECB: ECB Monthly 
Bulletin, March 2009, OECD: Economic Outlook, No. 84, December 2008; Consensus: Consensus Economics Inc., Consensus 
Forecasts, March 2009. ECB figures correspond to their macroeconomic projections. Numbers in the table refer to the mean of the 
respective projected interval. 
*According to the IMF update of March 2009, GDP growth in the Euro area will be -3.2% in 2009 and 0.1% in 2010. 
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Variables of the world economy 
Assumptions concerning the evolution of important variables related to the state of the 
world economy are shown in Table 4 below. We assume that the US and Japan will be 
in a deep recession in 2009 and tentatively recover in 2010. Prices in these countries 
will be declining in 2009, and also in 2010 in Japan. We forecast a massive decrease in 
world trade in 2009. Oil prices are expected to be much lower than they were during 
most of 2008, but to recover from their lows in December. The exchange rates of dollar 
and yen relative to the euro are assumed to be stable.   
 
Table 4. Variables of the world economy 
  2009 2010 
US GDP Growth Rate -2.9 1.0 
US Consumer Price Inflation -0.9 1.5 
US Short Term Interest Rate 0.3 1.0 
US Long Term Interest Rate 3.1 3.8 
Japan GDP Growth Rate -4.3 0.4 
Japan Consumer Price Inflation -0.8 -0.2 
Japan Short Term Interest Rate 0.7 1.0 
Japan Long Term Interest Rate 1.5 1.7 
World Trade -10 0.9 
Oil Price 51 57 
USD/Euro Exchange Rate 1.30 1.30 
100Yen/Euro Exchange Rate 1.27 1.27 
Apart from the development of world trade, long term interest rates and nominal exchange rates, all variables are 
exogenous to the EFN forecast, mostly taken from Consensus Economics (2009). The oil price is in US dollar per 
barrel (Brent, last month of period), all other variables are in percent. US short term interest rate: 3-month treasury 
bills. US long term interest rates: 10-year treasury bills. Japan short term interest rate: 3-month deposits (LIBOR). 
Japan long term interest rates: 10-year treasury bills. 
